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Abstract This paper develops a theory of female labor supply in a general
equilibrium framework in the context of a developing economy. In stage 1, men and
women decide whether to get married foreseeing the power and market dynamics in
stage 2. Single people make their own decisions whereas married couples make
decisions together, the power distribution among partners is determined endogenously. It is shown that female labor supply can take different shapes due to
structural differences between economies and multiple equilibria might occur,
causing low female labor force participation trap. As for policy implications, we
find that tax-break to the employers can give a huge boost to female employment
and may reduce the wage-gap. However, tax-benefit to women may widen the
wage-gap although both these policies empower women. We also conclude that true
empowerment should come with the freedom of choice (to work); increasing female
labor force participation does not necessarily empower women. Results found here
resonate well with previous empirical findings and suggest additional testable
implications.
Keywords Female labor supply  Collective utility model  Household
equilibrium  Power  Women’s empowerment
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1 Introduction
There exist differences between the preferences of men and women. These lead
them to take different decisions in similar situations. Many empirical studies find
that giving household subsidies to a woman rather than a man leads to different
outcomes in the household expenditures, notably, child nutrition and schooling (see
Senauer et al. 1988; Hopkins et al. 1994; Hoddinott and Haddad 1995; Handa 1999;
Duflo 2003; Gitter and Barham 2008). Recently, there have been empirical studies
suggesting differences in the household-decisions that can be attributed to
differences in the power distribution between husbands and wives within
households (Felkey 2013; Lancaster et al. 2006; Gitter and Barham 2008). It is,
therefore, necessary to study the economic issues driven by decisions of women
separately from those influenced by men; labor supply is one such decision.
The goal of this paper is to analytically study few policy implications on female
labor force participation, gender specific wage-gap and women’s empowerment by
developing a general theory of female labor supply—a theory that shows how the
nature of female labor supply can take different forms and shapes due to cultural or
structural differences between economies. Hence similar policies might have
different economic implications. Therefore, before considering any proposal for
policy reforms for raising female labor force participation to empower them, it is
necessary to understand its behavior in that particular economy.
Labor supply plays a very important role in an economy’s development. A robust
and ample labor force promotes development, and development, in turn, feeds back
on labor market conditions. Studying the behavior of labor market can give rise to
important policy implications. There have been many studies focusing on labor
supply and in recent times, there has also been a fair amount of research on female
labor supply in particular. Most of these are empirical (Blundell et al. 1987;
Arellano and Meghir 1992; Grossbard-Shechtman 1993; Nakamura and Nakamura
1994; Eissa and Liebman 1996; Greenwood et al. 2005), and some theoretical
(Grossbard-Shechtman 1984, 1993; Grossbard 2015; Apps and Rees 1997; Francois
1998; Vermeulen et al. 2006; Basu 2006; Atal 2012).
Usually a woman’s labor supply decision is not taken by her alone. All adult
members of the household, including the adult males would typically participate in
this decision. In a patriarchal society in a developing economy, the wife is often the
powerless newcomer who is usually exploited as cheap labor for household work.
Divorce is socially so costly that any threat to leave the family is not credible. This
leads to a vicious cycle in which the woman is not allowed to build human capital
and so remains powerless in household and other decision making, including child
nutrition and girls’ education. Empowering women by raising their labor force
participation may therefore address a lot of social problems, and ultimately assist in
the country’s economic development.
To study the behavior of female labor supply, it is thus important to understand
the household’s decision making process. On one hand, a working woman’s income
adds to the household’s total income which increases the collective utility; on the
other hand, working outside leaves a woman with less time to spend on householdwork which in turn decreases household-utility. Therefore, a woman’s labor supply
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decision depends on the collective utility of the household, the power distribution
between the members of the household and, of course, the market wages. The power
of a woman is determined endogenously. The more a woman contributes to the
family income compared to the other members of the family, the more power she
gains; again, as the power of the woman increases in the household, she has more
freedom to do what she prefers—household work or outside job.
This paper works with a general equilibrium model in which, for a married
couple, the consumption and female labor supply decisions are made by the husband
and wife together and the power distribution among them is determined
endogenously. The producers employ both men and women to produce the
consumption good; and everyone owns equal shares of profits earned by the firms.
Foreseeing these dynamics in stage two, the eligible men and women decide
whether to get married in stage 1. Using this model, it is shown that female labor
supply can be increasing, or decreasing, or backward-bending, with respect to a rise
in the market wage rate. Under certain circumstances, multiple equilibria might
occur in the female labor market so that two economies with exactly the same
fundamental characteristics might end up at two very different equilibria: one with
high female labor force participation and the other with a low participation.
Sometimes multiple equilibria might occur within households which give rise to the
female labor supply taking the form of a correspondence. In such a situation, a slight
rise in female labor demand may cause a huge increase in women’s employment.
The paper derives some important policy implications. We study the effects of
tax-break programs for the employers of female labor and tax-benefit programs for
women on their labor supply. It can be shown, using the model in this paper, that the
effects of these policies on female labor force participation are not necessarily
positive, contrary to what we would be led to believe if we rely solely on intuition.
Even in economies with similar fundamental characteristics, the equilibrium female
labor force participation may rise in one and fall in the other as a result of taxbenefits given to women or tax-breaks to the employers of women. This occurs
because of the multiplicity of equilibria. The wage-gap may widen in both cases, but
irrespective of that, these policies empower women. We also find that a tax-break to
employers of female labor may give a huge boost to female employment and it may
sometimes reduce the wage-gap.
There is a growing literature on collective models of household behavior
(Bourguignon and Chiappori 1992, 1994; Vermeulen 2002; Lundberg 2005). Some
of them relate female labor to the structure of household decision making
theoretically. Francois’ (1998) paper was focused on gender discrimination. He
showed that even in the absence of any gender-specific inefficiency, gender
discrimination in the labor market may arise just ‘‘from the interaction between
women and men within the household.’’ In Apps and Rees (1997) and Vermeulen
et al. (2006), individual utility was maximized subject to weekly exceeding the
reservation utility of the spouse (otherwise she would leave the household) and the
household’s budget constraint; then a sharing rule of the family income was
established in equilibrium leading to the labor supply decisions of the individual
members.
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Grossbard-Shechtman (1984, 1993) and Grossbard (2015) study the interdependence between marriage market and labor market (both male and female), where
marriage is treated as exchange of household work between spouses at a shadow
price. In these articles, each individual maximizes own utility by supplying his/her
own labor for household work and outside work and demanding household work
from the spouse. The general equilibrium occurs in all four markets and that
determines the labor supply decisions of both men and women for their household
work and outside work. Hence, in Grossbard-Shechtman (1984, 1993), Grossbard
(2015), Apps and Rees (1997) and Vermeulen et al. (2006), (1) individual utilities
are maximized first and then the sharing rule of family income is established (which
indicates the power distribution in the household); (2) men influence female labor
force participation only indirectly through the markets for labor (where the wages
are determined in equilibrium), outputs, and in the case of Grossbard’s models,
markets for household work. However, in the current paper, the husband and wife
together choose the power distribution in the household by choosing the wife’s
labor supply for household work and outside work. The wife’s say in this decision
depends upon her power within the household which is endogenously determined in
the household equilibrium. This leads us to study policy implications on female
labor force participation and particularly women’s empowerment.
The model developed in the present paper is more closely related to the one in Basu
(2006) and Atal (2012). Using a collective utility model, Basu (2006) showed how a
household might end up with multiple equilibria while choosing the effort-level of the
woman for working outside home. However, he assumed that wages are fixed which
can be justified as long as we are considering one household at a time. One household
(consisting of one woman) cannot have any significant impact on the wages. But
when we aggregate all the household decisions to get the total female labor supply, we
cannot take female and, for that matter, male wages to be fixed because market wages
are determined endogenously. They depend on the labor demand and the total labor
supply. Therefore, building upon the partial equilibrium model outlined in Basu
(2006), I have worked out a general equilibrium model to study the policy
implications of interest. Additionally, households were exogenously given in Basu
(2006), whereas in the current paper, men and women decide whether to get married
foreseeing the power dynamics and general equilibrium in the next stage. Atal (2012)
gives a sketch of the market equilibrium in stage two of the model developed in this
paper and conjectures the policy implications that are extensively analyzed here.

2 Model
The model in this paper is a static game with two stages where men and women
decide to get married in stage 1 and then join the labor force in stage 2. If not
married, the women choose how much effort to put in the household work and
outside work. However, if married, then the couple makes these decisions together
to maximize the collective household utility.

123

Say at home, or stay at home?

1085

There are N women and N men eligible for marriage, each one of them own equal
share of a firm producing the consumption good x with equal share of profits. Let
ei 2 ½0; 1 denote woman i’s effort put to work outside home and hi 2 ½0; 1 be her
effort on household work, ðei þ hi Þ 2 ½0; 1. Let a denote a woman’s exhaustion from
outside job in terms of household work, i.e., the exhaustion from working for one hour
outside is equivalent to the exhaustion from working a hours in the household, a 2 ð0; 2Þ.
Basically, working at home or outside are perfectly substitutable choices for the
woman and a works as a preference parameter here. Hence working one hour outside is
equivalent to working a hours at home for the woman. For simplicity, suppose there are
only two types of women.1 N1 women are of type a1 and the remaining ðN  N1 Þ
women are of type a2 , where 0\a2 \a1 \2 and N1 \N. Let wf be the wages for
female labor2 and wm be the wages for male labor. To focus on the analysis of female
labor supply, assume that the man always puts his entire effort 1 for outside work.
The male ðmÞ and female ð f Þ have different utility functions. While not married,
each individual maximizes his/her own utility. However, when they are married,
they take the household-decisions collectively. In stage 1 of this model, each single
individual decides whether to get married, and then in stage 2 the market-clearing
general equilibrium occurs.
After marriage, the couple’s objective is to maximize a weighted average of the
utility each of them gets from their collective decisions. The weights depend on the
power distribution in the household. Let hi 2 ½0; 1 denote the power of the type i
woman in the household if she is married. Hence ð1  hi Þ is the power of the man in
that household. Following the arguments of Agarwal (1997) and Basu (2006), it will
be assumed that this index of power is endogenous to the household, that is, while hi
influences household decisions, the decisions in turn influence hi . The woman may
gain more power by earning money from an outside job and thus increasing the total
household income; on the other hand, she can choose to do more of what she likes—
outside job or household work—if she has more power. This endogeneity of power
is not at odds with the empirical findings; see Bittman et al. (2003).
Let x be the consumption good and normalize its price at 1. For technical ease,
assume that there is only one consumption good and both agents gain some utility
from it. Let vð:Þ denote the utility of a person from the household work done by the
woman and assume vð0Þ  0; v0 ð:Þ [ 0; v00 ð:Þ\0, i.e., the utility is positive and
increases at a decreasing rate.3 Let us denote the disutility caused by effort on
outside work by cð:Þ, where c0 ð:Þ [ 0; c00 ð:Þ [ 0, i.e., the disutility increases at an
increasing rate. Assume that v0 ð1Þ [ c0 ð1Þ, i.e., for all h, the woman’s marginal
utility from her work at home is more than her marginal disutility from that. This
guarantees that the optimum choice of ei and hi are such that ðei þ hi Þ ¼ 1, i.e., the
woman puts her entire effort 1 on work—household and outside. Also assume that
vð0Þ  cð2Þ so that the total utility is non-negative.
1

This simplification can easily be generalized.

2

Women do not get paid in terms of wages for their household work.

3

The husband and the wife may have different utilities from the household work, see Atal (2012). To
minimize the notational complications, we assume they are the same. As long as the utility functions are
increasing and concave, the results remain qualitatively similar.
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This model does not allow the option of divorce or remarriage because it may
complicate things making the model intractable. One can justify this assumption if
the social cost of divorce or remarriage is huge. I also assume rational expectation
which guarantees that men and women can perfectly foresee the future and hence
they can also predict the divorce which leads them not to get married in the first
stage because divorce is costly. The model in this paper might not be applicable to
all the societies. I have a patriarchal society in a developing economy framework in
mind while setting up the model and analyzing it.
2.1 Stage 2: household and market equilibrium
We solve this two-stage game using backward induction. In stage 1, without loss of
generality, suppose type 1 women are married and type 2 women stay single. To
make sure this is indeed an equilibrium, we have to check the out of equilibrium
options as well. Following are the utility functions when they are single and when
they are married. Superscript s denotes single women’s labor choice.
If they are single, the individual utilities are:
 


ufi ¼ x þ v hsi  c hsi þ ai esi ; for i ¼ 1; 2




¼ x þ v 1  esi  c 1 þ ðai  1Þesi ;
um ¼ x  cð1Þ:
For a married couple, the collective utility is given by:
Ui ¼ x þ vðhi Þ  hi cðhi þ ai ei Þ  ð1  hi Þcð1Þ;

for i ¼ 1; 2

¼ x þ vð1  ei Þ  hi cð1 þ ðai  1Þei Þ  ð1  hi Þcð1Þ:
Note that the utility maximizing effort for outside job ðei Þ for a single woman might
not be the same as of a married woman because the married couple maximizes the
household utility instead of her own utility. The utilities are maximized subject to
the  budget constraints.
For a single woman,  the budget constraint is:

p
p
; for a single man, it is: x  wm þ 2N
; and for the married couple,
x  esi wf þ 2N


p
the budget constraint is: x  wm þ ei wf þ N , where p is the profit of the firm.
Since the utilities are strictly increasing in x, the budget constraints hold with
equality. Substituting for x from the budget constraints, we can re-write the utility
functions as follows:




p
e
þ v 1  esi  c 1 þ ðai  1Þesi ; for i ¼ 1; 2
u fi ¼ esi wf þ
2N
p
e
u m ¼ wm þ
 cð1Þ;
2N
e i ¼ wm þ ei wf þ p þ vð1  ei Þ  hi cð1 þ ðai  1Þei Þ  ð1  hi Þcð1Þ:
U
N
Typically, because of the dependence of the budget constraint on the non-wage
income p, we should have a family of labor supply curves (each curve indexed by
the profit-level). However, in this case, the utility maximizing labor supply will be
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independent of the level of non-wage income. This arises because we have a utility
function which is quasi-linear in the consumption good, and we are assuming an
interior solution. That is, any increase in non-wage income (wage rates being given)
would be fully reflected in a corresponding increase in the consumption good, x, to
restore budget equality. Hence, the utility functions of single women and married
households are maximized w.r.t. ei 2 ½0; 1. When the woman’s power is hi and the
market wage rate for her labor is wf , the utility maximizing effort ðei Þ by the woman
for her outside job is given by the solution of the first order condition: 4
wf ¼ v0 ð1  ei Þ þ hi ðai  1Þc0f ð1 þ ðai  1Þei Þ;

ð1Þ

where hi is endogenously determined in the household equilibrium (defined later).
For a single woman, it is:




wf ¼ v0 1  esi þ ðai  1Þc0f 1 þ ðai  1Þesi :
ð2Þ
Let us now focus on the couple with type i woman. The equation above gives us the
household-utility maximizing effort supplied by the woman for outside job, ei :


ei ¼ ei hi ; wf :
Implicitly differentiating the first order condition (1) , find that:
oei
\0 if and only if ai [ 1:
ohi

ð3Þ

The statement above simply means that if the woman’s disutility from working at
home is less than her disutility from working outside, then the more power she gains
in the household, the more she can choose to work at home. It also says that if the
woman prefers working at home more than the man likes her household work, then
the more power she gains, the more she can choose to work at home. True
empowerment comes with the freedom of choice.
The woman can acquire more power in the household by earning and
contributing more into the household income. Suppose the power of a woman
ðhi Þ in thehousehold
depends not only on the relative wages she earns compared to

ew

the man wi mf , but also on the prevailing relative market wage for female labor
 
wf
wf
wm . If wm is very high, then even a woman who does not actually go outside for a

job (i.e., ei ¼ 0), can enjoy a pretty high power by the mere availability of a very
w
good outside option. On the other hand, if wmf ¼ 0 (or a very low value), then the
woman cannot gain a lot of power by working outside even for full-time. Therefore,

w

we can write the power of a woman ðhi Þ in the household as a function of ei ; wmf so
 
w
that hi is increasing in ei and as wmf increases, hi shifts up:

4

If wf  v0 ð1Þ þ hi ðai  1Þc0 ð1Þ, then ei ¼ 0 and if wf  v0 ð0Þ þ hi ðai  1Þc0 ðai Þ, then ei ¼ 1.
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wf
hi ¼ hi e i ;
:
wm
for given market wage rates
Definition
 1 A household
 equilibrium

 in this model,


wf ; wm , is described by ei wf ; wm ; hi wf ; wm where:


 
 
ei wf ; wm ¼ ei hi wf ; wm ; wf
and






w
f
hi wf ; wm ¼ hi ei wf ; wm ;
:
wm

Now let us look at the producers’ side. Suppose the labor markets are perfectly
competitive and there exists some substitutability between male labor and female
labor. The producer chooses the amount of inputs (or the two kinds of labor) to
maximize profit:


p ¼ F Lf ; Lm  wm Lm  wf Lf ;


where F Lf ; Lm is the production function with two inputs—female labor and male
labor, with positive marginal products. 5 Assuming a strictly concave production
function, we get the demand for both kinds of labor by each firm:


oF Lf ; Lm
oFðLf ; Lm Þ
¼ wf and
¼ wm
oLm
oLf


D
) Lf ¼ LD
f wf ; wm andLm ¼ Lm ðwf ; wm Þ:
Concavity of the production function guarantees downward sloping labor demand
curves with an upward shift caused by the increase in wages for the other kind of
labor since male labor and female labor are substitutes to some extent. For further
simplification, we assume constant returns to scale so that p ¼ 0.6
Definition 2 As the price of the consumption good is assumed to be 1, the market
equilibriumof this model
is defined by the equilibrium wage rates for female and

male labor wf ; wm where the demand for labor equals its supply, i.e.,




w
;
w
LD
f
f
m ¼ N1 e1 þ ðN  N1 Þe2 ;




LD
m wf ; wm ¼ N:



Note that ei ¼ ei wf ; wm , given by the household equilibrium if type i women are
 
married; otherwise ei ¼ esi wf , given by the solution of equation (2).
5

To avoid any kind of complementarity


between
 the inputs, assume that the elasticity of substitution is at

least as much as 1, i.e.,
6

oF oF
oLf =oLm

ðLf =Lm Þ

d



oF oF
oLf =oLm

dðLf =Lm Þ

.

Even if we do not make this assumption, all the results of this model hold qualitatively.

123

Say at home, or stay at home?

1089

2.2 Stage 1: marriage decision and general equilibrium
Moving one step back, given the household and market equilibria, the general
equilibrium occurs when the marriage decisions are consistent so that no one would
like to deviate from his/her decision unilaterally. They get married if both of them
are better off being in a marriage (or a household). If any one of them can get a
strictly higher utility staying single, then he/she stays single. Assume that N is large
enough so that unilateral deviation does not change the market wages.
Note that because of our assumptions on vð:Þ and cð:Þ, the woman’s contribution
to the household utility is always positive and hence the man always wants to get
married. However, whether the woman wants to get married or not, that depends on
the utilities from being single or married. Hence the general equilibrium with type 1
women married and type 2 women staying single is described by the following
system of equations:



 

wm þ e1 wf þ v 1  e1  h1 c 1 þ ða1  1Þe1  1  h1 cð1Þ [ es1 wf




þ v 1  es1  c 1 þ ða1  1Þes1
and






es2 wf þ v 1  es2  c 1 þ ða2  1Þes2 [ wm þ e2 wf þ v 1  e2

 

 h2 c 1 þ ða2  1Þe2  1  h2 cð1Þ:
The first equation means that for a type 1 woman, the collective household utility is
more than her utility had she stayed single. The second equation means that type 2
women stay single because she prefers to do so.
Next, let us derive the female labor supply curve and consequently the equilibrium
assuming the single crossing property between the man’s and the woman’s utility
functions as two extreme cases. This means that we assume either of the following two
cases. In case I, ai [ 1 for all i and in case II, it is exactly the opposite, i.e., ai \1 for all
i. Let us analyze these two extreme cases in the following two sections and describe the
household equilibrium and the market equilibrium in each case.7 No matter what,
oes
single women’s outside work effort is increasing in their wages: owif [ 0.
2.3 Household work less painful
In this extreme case, suppose ai [ 1 for all i so that the women’s disutility from
working at home is less than their disutility from working outside. As a result, from
Eq. (3), the household’s collective utility maximizing effort supplied by the woman
oe1
for outside job decreases as her power increases: oh
\0. However, the woman can
1
1
acquire more power by working more outside (thus earning more): oh
oe1 [ 0. Thus
there exists a unique household equilibrium in this case. To find the market
equilibrium, we first need to construct the female labor supply from the household

7
For ai ¼ 1, the effort supplied by the woman does not depend on the power hi and hence the female
labor supply curve will just be increasing with the wages wf .
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equilibria at different market wages for female labor. From the first order condition
of the household’s utility maximization problem given by Eq. (1), it is easy to check
that:
oe1
[ 0:
owf
We can think of it as a substitution effect of a price-rise. The market wage-rate wf is
nothing but the price (or opportunity cost) of working one hour at home for the
woman. Hence, as a result of a rise in wages, she will want to work less at home and
work more outside. While this is the only effect of increase in the market wage-rate
for single women, it has an additional ‘‘power-gain effect’’ for married women. As
we have argued earlier, the more the market wage is, the more power the woman
earns:
oh1
[ 0;
owf
and the more power she earns, the less she wants to work outside because a1 [ 1.
Therefore, the total effect of the increased wages on her outside work choice is
ambiguous. As the wage-rate for female labor rises, the household equilibrium e1


may either increase or decrease or remain unchanged. If e1 wf ; wm increases as wf
 
increases, then the female labor supply curve is increasing as usual because es2 wf


is increasing in wf . But if ei wf ; wm decreases as wf increases, then interesting
outcomes may occur since the aggregate female labor supply curve may now be
decreasing. In Fig. 1, we can see a situation where the effort-level in the householdequilibrium falls as female-wages increase. This may give rise to a downward

Fig. 1 Changes in household equilibrium with increase in wf
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sloping or backward bending supply curve for female labor if married women’s
power gain effect is stronger than all women’s substitution effect of rise in their
wages.
While the mechanism that generates backward bending labor supply curve in this
model originates just from the endogeneity of the intra-household bargaining power
of the woman and her work-decision, I agree that there may exist other plausible
reasons why labor supply may be backward-bending. For example, there may be
income effects in labor supply in a usual labor-leisure choice model. But in the
current model, leisure does not add any utility, household-work does, which also
requires some physical labor involvement along with time.
Assuming downward sloping demand curve for female labor, with a backward
bending labor supply curve, we might have multiple equilibria in some situations in
the female labor market although there exists a unique household equilibrium.8 One
such situation is shown in Fig. 2.
Therefore, two economies, similar in every fundamental aspect, might end up at
two different equilibria and thus they look very different from outside in terms of
the outcome. One of them might have a very high female labor force participation in
equilibrium and low market wage rates. And in the other one, women may spend
more time at household work in equilibrium although the market wage rates in both
the labor markets are very high.
2.4 Outside work less painful
In this extreme case, we consider ai \1 for all i so that the women’s disutility from
working at home is more than their disutility from working outside. Hence, from
Eq. (3), as the power of the woman increases, her effort supply for outside job
oe1
increases: oh
[ 0. Since both the ‘‘power-gain effect’’ and effort supply are
1
increasing in this case, we might have multiple equilibria in a household as shown in
Basu (2006). As we did in the previous case, let us now find the market equilibrium
here. For that, we need to construct the female labor supply first, that is, allow the
female-wages to change and check what happens to the household equilibrium.
If we incorporate changes in wages for female-labor, the multiplicity of
household equilibria might not exist. To see this, first note that as wage-rate wf


increases, the power h1 increases and the effort-supply e1 h1 ; wf also increases.
After a sufficient increase in wf , multiple equilibria may vanish and the household
ends up at the unique equilibrium with a very high effort-level e1 . Similarly, for
sufficiently low wages for female-labor, the household may have a unique
equilibrium with very low effort-level. Since for wages in some particular range we
might have multiple equilibria for each household, the female labor supply for each
household in such a situation is given by a correspondence. If all the households
choose the same equilibrium, then the aggregate female labor supply looks like the
correspondence as in Fig. 3. In this case, a slight rise in female labor demand might
give a huge boost to the female labor force participation (in hours). If the number of
8

I have elsewhere, along with co-authors, established a different setting where, again with feasible
wages, one gets multiple equilibria though through a very different mechanism (see Atal et al. 2010).
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Fig. 2 Multiple equilibria in
female-labor market

households is very large and they choose one of the multiple equilibria randomly,
then the labor supply includes the entire shaded region shown in Fig. 3.
In the next section, we analyze some important policy implications targeted at
increasing the female labor force participation to empower women, in light of our
model.
3 Some tax implications
Although almost half of the population in the world is female, they occupy a much
smaller proportion of population in terms of employment. In the year 2000, women
held only 30 % share of the total employed positions. The average hourly wage-rate
of women was just three-quarters of that of men. Aiming at reducing the genderinequality, various countries have been considering different policies to increase
female labor force participation and reduce the wage-gap. They have been trying to
do so by providing micro-credit facilities targeted at women, various tax-schemes,
facilitating vocational training programs, raising general awareness of the society,
implementing affirmative action programs, and so on. These policies might not
generate the desired effect always (see Atal and Dubey 2014 on affirmative action.)
In this section, we analyze the implications of some tax policies on the female labor
supply, wage-gap and women’s empowerment.
Apps and Rees (1988, 1999a, b) have studied various tax reforms in the
household production models. Individual utilities were maximized subject to the
budget constraints given by a share of the family income; utility was generated from
consumption and household work as well. The focus of these studies however were
to analyze the effects on social welfare, whereas the focus in this paper is to study
the effect on women’s labor force participation, and more importantly, their
empowerment and wage-gap.
To gain some more tractability in this model, we analyze the policy implications
by taking some particular functional forms for the terms in the utility function and
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Fig. 3 Female labor supply
correspondence and multiple
equilibria in female labor market

the production function. The functional forms are chosen such that we do not lose
much generality in the outcomes of the model and still capture a developing
economy’s society to some extent. The household equilibria, the market equilibria
and the general equilibria are derived in the ‘‘Appendix’’. We use those results to
carry on the comparative statics results and study the policy implications. While
studying policy implications, we study only marginal changes in the policies which
do not affect the strict inequalities needed for the marriage decision, because the
changes can be made really small so that men and women do not change their states.
3.1 Income tax benefit to women
One of the policies specially aimed at increasing the participation of women in the
labor force includes giving tax-benefits to women on their incomes. Until recently,
women used to get a higher lump-sum tax benefit compared to men in India.9 There
has been a rising literature on gender-based taxation. Alesina et al. (2011) find that
‘‘tax rates on labor income should be lower for women than for men.’’ Using the
model described in Vermeulen et al. (2006), Myck et al. (2006) and Beninger et al.
(2006) find that although giving a lump-sum tax benefit to the man or the woman
raises the couple’s collective budget constraint by the same amount, the identity of
the receiver has gender-specific behavioral outcomes on the labor supply. To see the
implications of giving income tax benefit to women in our model, we can do the
following comparative statics exercise.
In case of an income tax benefit to women, the net female wage rate (gross
female wage rate minus taxes plus transfer payments) changes and a tax-benefit
simply means a rise in net female wages received. As a result, it is easy to find that
single women’s labor supply rises and given h, the married couple’s utility
maximizing effort supply of the woman also rises. Again, since the wife’s net wage
9

See http://www.caclubindia.com/forum/income-tax-rates-slabs-from-a-y-2001-02-to-a-y-2013-14-132138.
asp#.VEsHevnF-pc
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rate is now higher,she can
 gain more power from the same amount of effort put on
w

outside job, i.e., h e; wmf shifts up. This exercise has been worked out in Fig. 1 in

Sect. 2.3 for the case where household work is relatively less painful to all women.
From this figure, it is evident that the equilibrium effort supply of the woman (and
thus total female labor supply) might go up or go down as a result of the tax-benefit
to women. 10 Note that since a tax-benefit of value s on net wage-rate wf is
equivalent to a rise in the net wage rate by the same amount, the entire female labor
supply curve (or correspondence) shifts vertically down by that amount:


 
LSf wf þ s ¼ f
LSf wf ;
LSf denote the female labor supply before and after the introduction of
where LSf and f
tax-benefit, respectively. Hence, in an economy with a backward-bending female
labor supply curve as shown in Fig. 2 and multiple equilibria in the female labor
market, introducing a tax-benefit to women might lead to different outcomes
depending on which market equilibrium the economy is at. In Fig. 4, we can see that
a tax-benefit causes an increase in female labor force participation (in terms of
hours) in one equilibrium (from Lf 2 to e
L f 2 ), whereas, in the other equilibrium, it
e
falls: L f 1 \Lf 1 . As a result, the wages of both men and women change causing a
change in the intra-household bargaining power of women, which then leads to a
change in female labor supply.
Finally, at the new general equilibrium, for the specific functional forms in
‘‘Appendix’’, as a result of the introduction of a tax-benefit program to women,
female employment rises, female wages fall and male wages rise causing the wagegap to widen if the female labor supply is increasing. Opposite happens if we are on
the downward slope of a backward bending labor supply. In both the cases, female
power rises. There have been many empirical works for measuring the effectiveness
of some tax-benefit programs (see Eissa and Liebman 1996; Blundell et al. 1998;
Grogger 2003). Most of them find a positive impact on women’s labor force
participation. Eissa and Liebman (1996) found that for one group of women, the
effect was positive and for another group of women, it was zero.
Note that even when the wage-gap is widening, women’s power is still
increasing. So widening wage-gap cannot indicate loss of female power. From
welfare’s point of view, giving income tax benefit to increase female labor force
participation and thus empower women is a welfare improving policy if the
woman’s disutility from working at home is more than her disutility from working
outside.11 Here comes the freedom of choice. If women like to work at home more
than working outside, then giving incentives to improve female labor force
participation may increase female power, but at the cost of reduced welfare.

10

If outside work is relatively less painful, as in Sect. 2.2, the female labor supply will go up.

11

This is a sufficient condition, but not necessary.
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Fig. 4 Introduction of taxbenefit might have different
effects at different equilibria

3.2 Tax-break to the employers of female labor
Another policy we may consider for raising female labor force participation is
giving tax-break to the employers of women. This will increase the demand for
female labor. In Fig. 5, consider a situation where an economy starts with a demand
for labor LD
f 0 and it is at a low participation equilibrium Lf 0 . Then, due to a taxbenefit to the employers for employing women at work, the demand for female labor
shifts up to the one given by LD
f 1 in Fig. 5. As a result, the economy reaches a new
equilibrium at Lf 1 where both the supply and demand for female labor are much
more compared to the initial equilibrium causing a huge increase in women’s
employment. Note that the relative wages go down as a result, causing a loss of
female power in the household, which may lead to a fall in female labor supply
again.
At the new general equilibrium, for the specific functional forms in ‘‘Appendix’’,
the introduction of a tax-break program to the employers of female labor will be as
effective in increasing the women’s employment and their empowerment as in the
case of the tax-benefit program worked out in the previous section. Additionally,
unlike the previous case, we have an increase in female wages leading to an
ambiguous effect on the wage-gap as opposed to a widening wage-gap. In fact, in
this case, wage-gap reduces under certain parametric restrictions.
And, last but not the least, the impact on welfare, of giving a tax-break to the
employers of female labor, is identical to that of giving equal amount of tax-benefit
to female employees. Hence, in the model worked out in the ‘‘Appendix’’, giving a
tax-break to employers is clearly a better policy instrument than the tax-benefit to
women. In fact, in case of a female labor supply correspondence, if the government
decides to rescind on the policy slowly, i.e., by gradually reducing the tax-break so
that the demand for female labor moves back to the initial one, the economy may
end up being at the high participation equilibrium instead of the low one where it
originally started, as shown in Fig. 5.

123

1096

V. Atal

Fig. 5 Tax-break to the
employers for employing
women at work may give a huge
boost to female labor force
participation

4 Conclusion
In this paper, we developed a theoretical model for studying the nature of female
labor supply in a developing economy. Since the labor supply decision of a woman
is taken by the entire household instead of just the individual herself, we have
considered a collective utility model to explain the behavior of female labor supply.
The power of the woman, and thus the power distribution between all members of
the household, has been taken to be endogenous here. Under this setting, it has been
shown that female labor supply can take various shapes as the market wage rate
changes. Sometimes multiple equilibria might occur in the female labor market.
Hence we can have different policy implications for different economies depending
on the behavior (or shapes) of their female labor supply (and also their demand for
female labor). Not only that, policy implications might differ for the same economy
at different time-points depending on the initial equilibrium before the policyimposition.
In light of the general equilibrium model developed in this paper, we derived
some important tax implications on female labor force participation, women’s
empowerment at household bargaining and the wage-gap between men and women.
We analyzed the effects of tax-benefit programs for women and tax-break programs
for their employers. These policies may increase female labor force participation
and increase female power, but they may widen the wage-gap between men and
women. Tax-break to the employers of female employees may work as a better tool
for reducing the wage-gap, increasing female labor force participation and
empowering women. Welfare improvement is the same under these policies.
In the entire analysis above, we assumed that women have same productivity
which is far from reality. Further research on female labor supply and women’s
empowerment can be done where women have heterogeneous skills. We can think
of the scope of education as well in this context. Education can help an individual in
acquiring more skill and thus gain more power to bargain for higher wages from the
employer. However, getting some education is costly. Even if basic primary
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education may be freely available in many countries, acquiring education may
involve an opportunity cost because of the time spent on it. This might give rise to
interesting outcomes in women’s participation decisions in skilled or unskilled labor
force, the literacy rate among them and women’s empowerment in an economy.
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Appendix: Model with specific functional forms
Let us take the following functional forms for vð:Þ and cð:Þ:
vðhÞ ¼ A lnðE þ hÞ; A [ 0 and E is the base of natural logarithm;
cðhÞ ¼ Bh2 ; B [ 0:
Assume that A  8B so that for all h, the woman’s marginal utility from her work at
home is more than her marginal disutility from that. This guarantees that the
optimum choice of e and h by the household are such that ðe þ hÞ ¼ 1, i.e., the
woman puts her entire effort 1 on work—household and outside. Also, assume that
2 [ a1 [ 1 [ a2 [ 0, so that type 1 women are more likely to get married compared to type 2 women.
Since the utilities are strictly increasing in x, the budget constraints hold with
equality. Substituting for x from the budget constraints, we define the utility
functions as follows:
e
u fi ¼ ei wf þ A lnðE þ 1  ei Þ  Bð1 þ ðai  1Þei Þ2 ;
e
u m ¼ wm  B;
e i ¼ wm þ ei wf þ A lnðE þ 1  ei Þ  Bhi ð1 þ ðai  1Þei Þ2 ð1  hi ÞB:
U
e i are maximized w.r.t. ei 2 ½0; 1. Therefore, for a single woman, the utility
e
u fi and U
 
maximizing effort esi is given by the solution of the following:
wf 


A
¼ 2Bðai  1Þ 1 þ ðai  1Þesi :
ðE þ 1  esi Þ

On the other hand, the utility maximizing effort by the married woman for her
outside job is given by the solution of the following first order condition:12
wf 

12

If wf 

A
Eþ1

A
¼ 2Bhi ðai  1Þ½1 þ ðai  1Þei :
ðE þ 1  ei Þ

 2Bhi ð1  ai Þ, then ei ¼ 0 and if wf 

A
E

ð4Þ

 2Bhi ai ð1  ai Þ, then ei ¼ 1.
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Let us consider the parameters in the range where we always get interior solution for
household equilibrium. Implicitly differentiating the first order condition (4), find that:
oei
\0 if and only if ai [ 1:
ohi
Suppose the intra-household
bargaining power of a married woman ðhi Þ as a

wf
function of ei ; wm is defined as follows:
hi
ð1 þ ei Þ wf c
¼
; c [ 0:
2
ð1  hi Þ
wm
Hence the household equilibrium is given by ei which is the solution of the following equation:




2
wm c
A
1þ
wf 
¼ 2Bðai  1Þ 1 þ ðai  1Þei :


ð1 þ ei Þ wf
ðE þ 1  ei Þ
Implicitly differentiating the household equilibrium w.r.t. wf , we find that:


cð1hi Þ
A
1  wf
wf  Eþ1e
ð
oei
iÞ

:
¼

owf
2 cð1hi Þ

A
A
w
þ
2Bh
ð
a

1
Þ
þ

2
i
f
i
ð1þei Þ
ðEþ1ei Þ
ðEþ1ei Þ
A
iff ai [ 1. Hence the female labor supply
ðEþ1ei Þ
from the household with type i woman has a downward sloping portion iff one of
the following conditions is true:


1.
cð1h Þ
A
ai [ 1 and wf i wf  Eþ1e
[ 1;

ð
iÞ


2.
cð1hi Þ
2

A
A
 wf .
ai \1 and
2 þ 2Bhi ðai  1Þ \
ð1þei Þ ðEþ1ei Þ
ðEþ1ei Þ

From (4), we know that wf [

Note that the single women’s labor supply is always increasing. The aggregate
female labor supply is given by:
Lf ¼ N1 e1 þ ðN  N1 Þes2 :
Now let us look at the producer’s side. The production function is given by a
constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production function:


1
F Lf ; Lm ¼ Lbf L1b
m ; 0\b  :
2
The producer chooses the amount of inputs (or the two kinds of labor) to maximize
profit. Therefore we get the demand for both kinds of labor by the firm:
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b wm
Lf ¼ X
ð1  bÞ wf

1b



ð1  bÞ wf
; Lm ¼ X
b wm

b
;

where X is the total output produced which in equilibrium will be such that:
X ¼ wf Lf þ Nwm :
Hence the market equilibrium is given by the following system of equations where
s  0 is the potential tax-benefit to women and t  0 is the potential tax-break to the
employer of female labor.
8


A
>
¼ 2Bhi ðai  1Þ 1 þ ðai  1Þei ;
wf þ s 
>
>

>
ðE þ 1  ei Þ
>
>
 c


>
>
>
1 þ ei wf þ s
hi
>
>

¼
>
;
>
>
wm
2
1  hi
>
>
>
< 


A
¼ 2Bðai  1Þ 1 þ ðai  1Þesi ;
wf þ s 
ð5Þ
s
>
ðE þ 1  e i Þ
>
>
>
>
b
w
>
>
 m ;
>
N1 e1 þ ðN  N1 Þes2 ¼ N
>
>
ð
1

b
Þ
wf  t
>
>
>


>
>
>
w

t
wm
f
>
:
¼ 0:
þ ð1  bÞ ln
b ln
1b
b
Additionally, the following two conditions must hold in general equilibrium so that
no one unilaterally deviates from marrying or staying single.




 

es  e1
wm  es1  e1 wf þ A ln 1 þ 1
þ Bða1  1Þ es1 2 þ ða1  1Þes1
s
E þ 1  e1


 

 h1 e1 2 þ ða1  1Þe1 




 

es  e2
wm  es2  e2 wf þ A ln 1 þ 2
þ Bða2  1Þ es2 2 þ ða2  1Þes2
s
E þ 1  e2


 

 h2 e2 2 þ ða2  1Þe2 
Under our initial assumption of 2 [ a1 [ 1 [ a2 [ 0, it can be checked that the
conditions above indeed hold true in equilibrium. Note that we are considering strict
inequalities only so that when we study policy implications, we can change the
parameters in such a little amount that these inequalities do not change, hence the
number of married couples and singles remain the same before and after the
introduction of the policies.
The total welfare in the society is given by:


e 1 þ ðN  N1 Þ e
W ¼ N1 U
uf 2 þ e
um
h





2 
i
¼ Nwm þ wf þ s Lf þ N1 A ln E þ 1  e1  Bh1 1 þ ða1  1Þe1 B 1  h1
h



2 i
þ ðN  N1 Þ A ln E þ 1  es2  B 1 þ ða2  1Þes2 B :
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Suppose g 2 fs; tg is a parameter in the model. Then, for finding the comparative
w
statics results of g on e; h and wmf when g ¼ 0, we have to differentiate the equilibrium conditions given above with respect to g and evaluate at g ¼ 0. Substituting
from (5) and re-arranging, we get:
!
8

 

A
1
A
ohi owf os
>
2 oei

>
>
þ  wf 

 ¼ 0;
þ 2Bhi ðai  1Þ
>

2

>
og hi
ðE þ 1  ei Þ og og og
>
> ðE þ 1  e i Þ
>
>
>
>
1 oei
1
oh 1 owf 1 os 1 owm
>
>
 i
þ

þ 

¼ 0;
>


>
>
ð1 þ ei Þ og chi 1  hi og wf og wf og wm og
>
>
!
>
<
s
A
owf os
2 oei

 ¼ 0;
þ
2B
ð
a

1
Þ
i
2
>
s
>
og
og og
ðE þ 1  ei Þ
>
>
>


>
>
oe1
oes2
b wm 1 owf
1 owm
b wm ot
>
>
>
¼ 0;
N
þ
N

N
þ
N

ð
Þ
N
1
1
>
>
ð
1

b
Þ
w
w
ð
1

bÞ w2f og
og
og
w
og
og
>
f
f
m
>
>
>
>
>
b owf ð1  bÞ owm b ot
>
:
¼ 0:
þ

wf og
wm og wf og
Solving, we find that the denominator D is:
ð1h1 Þ

Dwm ¼ ð1  bÞ



A
wf  Eþ1e

ð
1Þ



N1 bc wf
oLf Lf

 :
þ 
owf wf
ð1h1 Þ
2

A
A
wf  Eþ1e
2 þ 2Bh1 ða1  1Þ þc
ð1þe1 Þ
ð
ðEþ1e1 Þ
1Þ

For b; c; BA small enough, this denominator is positive.
Now let us study the policy implications under the above mentioned functional
forms.

Income tax benefit to women
We are looking for the effects of an increase in a tax-benefit s from 0. Fully
differentiating the equilibrium system w.r.t. s and solving, we get:
dLf
1 Lf oLf
¼
D wf wm owf
ds
[ 0 if increasing labor supply,
\0 if on the downward slope of backward bending labor supply.
Hence female employment will rise if the female labor supply is not backward
bending. Also,
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dwf
1 ð1  bÞ oLf
¼
D wm owf
ds
dwm
b 1 oLf
¼
wf D owf
ds
 
wf
d wm
1 oLf
¼
Dw2m owf
ds
Hence male wages will go up and female wages will go down widening the wagegap if the labor supply curve is increasing and opposite happens for the backward
bending portion. Note that even when the wage-gap is widening, women’s power
dh
still increases: ds1  0. So widening wage-gap may not indicate loss of female
power.
Tax-break to the employers of female labor


In this case, effectively, the female wages to the employers are wf  t ; t [ 0. We
are looking for the effect of a rise in t from 0. Solving, we find the exact same effect
on women’s employment and power and welfare as in the previous policy of giving
income tax benefit to women. The only difference is in the female wages and the
wage-gap.
dwf dwf
¼
þ 1 [ 0;
ds
 dt
 
w
w
d wmf
d wmf
[
;
dt
ds


dh1 dh1
¼
 0:
dt
ds
Hence wf increases and there is an ambiguous effect on wage-gap. More importantly, sometimes, the wage-gap might widen from tax-benefit, but reduce by giving
tax-break to employers.
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